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Theses
•	The	Russian	economy	has	experienced	what	has	proven	to	be	the	most	pain-
ful	crisis	for	society	since	2000,	or	when	Vladimir	Putin	became	President	
of	 the	Russian	Federation	 for	 the	first	 time.	The	crisis	has	worsened	 the	
financial	situation	of	people	in	Russia	mainly	due	to	the	high	inflation	rate	
and	a	persistent	and	deep	decrease	in	real	wages	which	primarily	affected	
poor	people,	large	families	and	residents	of	big	cities.	At	the	same	time,	the	
unemployment	rate	 is	 low,	which	 is	due	 to	 the	nature	of	 the	Russian	 job	
market	in	which	informal	employment	and	employment	in	the	public	sec-
tor	have	a	large	share.	As	such,	it	remains	to	some	extent	isolated	from	the	
consequences	of	the	crisis.	
•	During	this	crisis,	society	is	embarking	on	a	strategy	of	passive	adaptation	
as	people	 focus	on	 individual	 survival	 strategies.	The	dominant	 strategy	
pursued	by	all	social	classes	involves	seeking	opportunities	to	save	money	
by	 limiting	 expenses	 and	modifying	 the	 hitherto	 applied	model	 of	 con-
sumption.	For	some	social	groups,	their	method	for	weathering	the	crisis	
also	 involves	 seeking	 additional	 employment	 opportunities	 in	 the	 grey	
economy	 (the	 so	 called	 ‘garage	 economy’)	 and	 spending	 the	 savings	 they	
made	in	previous	years.	The	crisis	has	also	contributed	to	a	major	drop	in	
economic	migration	to	Russia.	
•	The	crisis	has	triggered	a	decline	in	the	social	mood.	This	decline	does	not	
translate	 into	a	drop	in	declared	approval	ratings	for	President	Vladimir	
Putin,	nor	has	it	manifested	itself	in	mass	protests.	Protests	happen	rarely,	
they	are	usually	isolated	and	focus	on	specific	local	demands.	The	protest-
ers	avoid	referring	to	political	slogans,	which	makes	their	demonstrations	
distant	from	any	form	of	protest	against	the	Kremlin.	
•	The	government	is	trying	to	minimise	the	likelihood	of	an	outbreak	of	pro-
tests	related	to	the	prolonged	crisis	by	making	efforts	to	build	up	the	image	
of	President	Vladimir	Putin	and	to	maintain	his	high	approval	rating.	Other	
methods	include:	postponing	unpopular	decisions	and	shifting	the	respon-
sibility	for	problems	onto	lower	levels	of	government	or	external	enemies,	
and	stepping	up	the	repressive	nature	of	the	system.	Due	to	limitations	on	
the	operation	of	institutions	which	are	independent	of	the	government,	in	
the	present	situation	there	are	no	leaders	who	could	become	mouthpieces	
for	social	discontent.
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InTroducTIon
The	economic	crisis	in	Russia	has	mainly	been	brought	about	by	a	dramatic	
fall	 in	the	price	of	oil	on	global	markets.	Revenues	from	oil	exports	used	to	
account	for	half	of	the	Russian	state	budget’s	total	revenue.	The	crisis	is	caus-
ing	mounting	negative	consequences	for	society.	The	present	crisis	differs	from	
the	1998	recession	and	the	economic	slump	observed	in	2008–2009	in	that	it	is	
long-lasting	(real	incomes	earned	by	Russians	have	dropped	for	the	third	year	
in	a	row).	This	has	been	the	first	such	persistent	decline	in	the	standard	of	liv-
ing	since	2000,	which	was	when	Vladimir	Putin	took	over	the	presidency	from	
Boris	Yeltsin.	This	publication	is	an	attempt	to	describe	the	scale	of	the	crisis	
and	its	social	consequences.	The	first	part	discusses	the	condition	of	Russian	
society	during	the	crisis,	the	consequences	of	the	recession	for	the	standard	of	
living	of	Russian	people,	and	the	strategies	society	is	adopting	to	survive	the	
economic	crisis.	The	second	part	contains	an	analysis	of	the	shift	in	social	mood	
and	its	impact	on	the	stability	of	the	political	system	in	Russia.	The	final	part	is	
an	attempt	to	predict	the	possible	consequences	of	the	present	crisis.
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I. The fInancIal sITuaTIon of russIan socIeTy 
durIng The crIsIs
The	ongoing	economic	crisis	is	causing	negative	consequences	for	a	major	por-
tion	of	Russian	society.	In	mid-2016,	a	staggering	78%	of	Russians	claimed	to	
have	been	personally	affected	by	these	consequences1.	The	initial	deterioration	
of	society’s	financial	situation	was	recorded	in	the	first	months	of	2015.	The	
situation	of	the	population	deteriorated	mainly	as	a	result	of	the	high	inflation	
rate	caused	by	a	drop	in	the	value	of	the	Russian	currency.	This	in	turn	had	
been	caused	by	a	slump	in	the	price	of	oil	and	the	sanctions	imposed	by	the	
West	after	Russia’s	annexation	of	Crimea	and	commencement	of	the	war	in	the	
Donbas	(between	the	beginning	of	2014	and	the	beginning	of	2015	the	rouble	
fell	by	nearly	50%	against	the	US	dollar).	The	rapid	price	increase	has	also	been	
a	result	of	the	embargo	on	the	import	of	foodstuffs	from	the	West	which	Russia	
introduced	in	August	2014	in	response	to	sanctions	imposed	on	it.	This	embargo	
has	backfired,	though,	and	has	mainly	affected	the	Russian	economy	which	is	to	
a	large	extent	dependent	on	the	import	of	agricultural	produce	and	foodstuffs.	
Due	to	this,	in	2014	the	inflation	rate	was	11.4%,	while	in	2015	it	was	12.9%.	This	
was	the	highest	rate	recorded	since	2008.
The	rapid	price	increase	started	back	in	December	2014.	It	covered	mainly	ne-
cessities	such	as	food	–	in	2015	the	price	of	foodstuffs	went	up	by	more	than	
20%	on	average	and	in	some	of	the	product	categories	the	prices	increased	by	
more	than	40%.	A	major	price	increase	was	also	recorded	in	categories	such	as	
household	goods,	medicines	and	selected	services	(in	particular	those	connected	
with	foreign	tourism	and	the	housing	industry).	As	a	consequence,	less	afflu-
ent	social	groups	were	more	severely	affected	by	the	crisis	because	the	costs	of	
purchase	of	necessities	and	basic	services	grew	faster	than	other	goods.	Despite	
a	drop	in	the	inflation	rate	in	2016,	society	considers	inflation	to	be	the	most	
perceptible	manifestation	of	the	crisis.	The	inflation	and	shortages	of	certain	
goods	alongside	the	international	political	situation	have	continued	to	top	the	
so-called	‘fear	index’	identifying	phenomena	which	worry	Russians	the	most,	
compiled	by	the	All-Russian	Public	Opinion	Research	Centre	(VCIOM)2.
1	 Затяжной	спад	в	экономике.	Что	предпринимают	потребители	и	бизнес	в	России?,	
PWC,	 16	 June	 2016,	 http://www.pwc.ru/ru/press-releases/2016/consumer-business-re-
port.html
2	 “Fear	index”	by	the	All-Russian	Public	Opinion	Research	Centre	(WCIOM),	http://wciom.
ru/news/ratings/indeks_straxov/
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The crisis has had a limited impact on the job market. Unlike in the case of 
the 2008–2009 crisis, adaptation to the altered conditions is progressing 
slowly and includes a long-term decrease in real wages and real incomes. 
Wage	stagnation	was	initially	observed	in	January	2014,	and	in	November	2014	
wages	began	to	fall.	In	2015,	the	fall	in	real	wages	amounted	to	9.5%	year-on-
year,	while	in	the	period	between	January	and	August	2016	it	was	0.3%	when	
compared	with	the	corresponding	period	in	20153.	However,	when	converted	to	
US	dollars,	the	wages	earned	by	Russians	fell	by	40%	–	from	US$	936	in	2013	to	
US$	558	in	20154.	This	has	affected	the	Russian	middle	class	which	uses	foreign	
goods	and	services	more	frequently	than	other	groups.	Russian	society	has	been	
affected	by	this	dramatic	and	durable	drop	in	wages	for	the	first	time	since	1998.	
Moreover,	the	official	wage	statistics	take	into	account	solely	large	and	medium-
sized	companies	which	employ	around	46%	of	the	total	workforce.	According	to	
economists,	the	larger	part	of	the	job	market	which	is	omitted	from	official	sta-
tistics,	has	recorded	a	more	significant	drop	in	real	wages	amounting	to	10–15%.
Real	incomes	earned	by	Russians	continued	to	fall	at	a	slower	pace	than	real	
wages.	This	was	in	part	caused	by	the	fact	that	Russian	people	gradually	spent	
their	foreign	currencies	savings5	(in	2015	real	incomes	fell	by	6.3%,	while	real	
wages	fell	by	as	much	as	9.6%).	Due	to	the	crisis,	the	share	of	income	from	eco-
nomic	activity	in	the	total	income	of	the	Russian	population	(earned,	for	exam-
ple,	from	petty	trade)	has	been	on	the	wane	–	in	2015	it	was	the	lowest	since	the	
fall	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	amounted	to	7.3%.
Despite	the	crisis,	the	unemployment	rate	remained	practically	unchanged	and	
amounted	to	5.4%	in	October	20166.	The	number	of	individuals	registered	with	
Russian	job	centres	as	unemployed	was	more	than	four	times	lower,	which	is	
largely	due	to	the	fact	that	Russian	people	are	rather	unwilling	to	report	they	
are	unemployed	to	state	institutions	dealing	with	employment	because	these	
are	inefficient.	The	reasons	behind	the	low	unemployment	rate	during	the	crisis	
should	be	traced	mainly	to	the	unique	nature	of	the	Russian	job	market.	Firstly,	
the	share	of	individuals	working	in	the	grey	economy	in	Russia	has	been	on	the	
3	 Wage	dynamics	data	compiled	by	the	Central	Bank,	http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/B00_24/
IssWWW.exe/Stg/d000/i000050r.htm
4	 Мониторинг	 социально-экономического	 положения	 и	 социального	 самочувствия	
населения.	May	2016,	ed.	Л.	Овчарова	2016,	goo.gl/exEWsW
5	 According	to	official	statistics,	income	earned	from	the	sale	of	foreign	currency	savings	is	
included	in	total	income.
6	 Data	by	Rosstat	according	to	methodology	adopted	by	the	International	Labour	Organisation.
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rise	since	2011	and	at	present	it	is	over	18%7,	which	is	nearly	9	million	people.	
The	ongoing	economic	crisis	has	not	halted	the	upward	trend	regarding	infor-
mal	employment.	According	to	estimates	by	the	Higher	School	of	Economics,	
the	average	share	of	unregistered	remuneration	in	total	wages	is	around	25%,	
which	generates	immense	losses	for	the	state	budget.	However,	the	grey	econo-
my	forms	a	buffer	protecting	the	population	from	the	consequences	of	the	crisis	
and	offering	opportunities	to	find	supplementary	employment.
Secondly,	maintaining	a	low	unemployment	rate	is	also	possible	due	to	an	in-
crease	in	the	number	of	individuals	in	part-time	employment	and	to	the	reduc-
tion	of	salaries	in	many	sectors	of	the	economy.	In	response	to	the	crisis,	the	em-
ployers	tend	to	lower	the	salaries	or	reduce	full-time	employment	to	part-time.	
During	the	crisis	the	employers’	backlogs	of	payment	began	to	slowly	rise,	but	
the	total	amount	is	still	lower	than	in	the	1990s.	According	to	estimates	by	the	
Higher	School	of	Economics,	in	Q1	2016	24%	of	Russian	families	were	affected	by	
salary	reductions,	19%	by	delayed	payments	of	remuneration	and	9%	by	forced	
unpaid	leave,	dismissal	or	reduction	of	full-time	employment	to	part-time8.	Due	
to	high	costs	of	lay-offs	the	employers	prefer	to	keep	the	level	of	employment	
unchanged	despite	the	lower	demand	for	staff.	
The fall in real wages and the increase in prices during the crisis have 
contributed to an increase in the number of individuals affected by pov-
erty and extreme poverty by	3.1	million	in	20159.	According	to	estimates	by	
the	Russian	statistical	office	Rosstat,	in	2015	13.3%	of	Russians	lived	below	the	
subsistence	level10.	This	has	been	the	worst	result	since	2008,	but	not	the	worst	
in	Russia’s	modern	history,	as	–	according	to	official	statistics	–	back	in	1999	
28.4%	of	Russians	lived	below	this	standard.	According	to	researchers,	groups	
particularly	at	risk	of	experiencing	the	negative	consequences	of	the	crisis	in-
clude	people	raising	children	(in	2015,	more	than	21%	of	them	lived	in	poverty11)	
7	 Ежемесячный	мониторинг	социально–экономического	положения	и	самочувствия	
населения	2015	–	март	2016,	ed.	Т.	М.	Малева,	March	2016,	http://www.ranepa.ru/im-
ages/docs/monitoring/ek-monitoring/monitoring-march-2016.pdf
8	 Мониторинг	 социально–экономического	 положения	 и	 самочувствия	 населения.	
Май	2016,	ed.	Л.	Овчарова,	2016,	goo.gl/aCy6L5
9	 Человеческий	капитал	как	фактор	социально-экономического	развития,	ed.	Я.	Кузь-
минов,	Л.	Овчарова,	Л.	Якобсон,	Moscow	2016,	goo.gl/LciPvo
10	 Data	by	Rosstat,	http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/
population/level/#
11	 Человеческий	капитал	как	фактор…,	op. cit.
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and	low	earners12.	The	higher	proportion	of	negative	opinions	expressed	by	the	
individuals	surveyed	regarding	their	financial	situation	is	further	proof	of	the	
deteriorating	financial	situation	of	people	in	Russia.	In	2015,	the	group	which	in-
cludes	(self-declared)	poor	and	extremely	poor	people,	increased	almost	twofold	
across	various	surveys	13.	Meanwhile,	between	the	end	of	2015	and	August	2016	
the	number	of	individuals	who	declare	that	they	have	too	little	money	to	buy	
enough	food	and	those	who	cannot	afford	to	buy	clothes	remained	stable	and	
amounted	to	around	40%	in	total14.	Among	those	who	claimed	to	belong	to	this	
group	are:	families	with	children,	residents	of	rural	areas,	people	without	uni-
versity	education,	pensioners,	and	individuals	living	in	one-person	households.
The social consequences of the crisis vary considerably between individual 
regions, in part due to the diminishing transfers of funds from the federal 
budget to regional budgets	(during	the	2009	crisis	the	transfers	of	funds	to	
the	regions	rose	by	around	a	third	on	average,	whereas	in	2015	they	decreased	
by	3%,	and	in	the	first	half	of	2016	by	another	12%).	This	is	to	a	large	extent	re-
flected	in	expenses	the	authorities	have	planned	for	what	is	broadly	understood	
as	welfare	policy.	This	forms	a	major	portion	of	expenses	in	nearly	all	territorial	
units.	In	the	majority	of	regions	of	the	Russian	Federation,	2015	saw	a	reduction	
in	spending	on	the	housing	sector,	culture	and	education.	This	has	had	a	nega-
tive	impact	on	the	quality	of	services	offered	in	these	sectors.	According	to	es-
timates	by	the	Civil	Initiatives	Committee	headed	by	economist	Alexei	Kudrin,	
a	collaborator	of	the	Kremlin,	regions	with	the	worst	economic	situation	dur-
ing	the	present	crisis	include:	Moscow,	the	Republic	of	Mordovia	and	the	Mari	
El	Republic,	and	also	the	Kemerovo,	Kurgan,	Novosibirsk,	Nizhny	Novgorod,	
Penza,	Pskov,	Samara,	Sverdlovsk	oblasts	and	the	Jewish	Autonomous	Oblast15.	
The	crisis	has	relatively	heavily	affected	those	regions	in	which	large	industrial	
plants	of	the	automotive	and	machine	building	sectors	are	located,	in	particular	
industrial	cities,	including	the	so-called	monocities	(cities	built	around	a	single	
large	industrial	plant).	According	to	estimates	by	the	Federal	Guard	Service	
of	the	Russian	Federation	(FSO),	60%	of	residents	of	monocities	consider	the	
12	 Население	 России	 в	 2016	 году:	 доходы,	 расходы	 и	 социальное	 самочувствие.	 Мо-
ниторинг	НИУВШЕ,	ed.	Л.	Овчарова,	goo.gl/jZIUEc
13	 Individuals	who	declared	that	they	cannot	afford	to	cater	for	their	basic	needs	regarding	
food	and	clothing.
14	 Население	России	в	2016	году…,	op. cit.
15	 https://komitetgi.ru/projects/2901/
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situation	in	the	area	where	they	live	“hard	to	bear”	or	“unbearable”16.	However,	
due	to	the	residents’	strong	dependence	on	one	dominant	industrial	plant,	this	
mood	rarely	translates	into	mass	protests.	The	crisis	has	less	severely	affected	
the	regions	which	focus	on	such	branches	of	the	economy	as:	agriculture,	the	
mining	industry	and	the	armaments	industry.	
The ongoing economic crisis has contributed to a deterioration of the situ-
ation of all social classes and, in the case of many groups, to permanent 
degradation caused by inflation and lower wages. Although	so	far	there	has	
been	no	significant	increase	in	the	scale	of	social	inequalities,	the	crisis	is	caus-
ing	shortages	of	goods	and	services	of	the	same	quality	as	hitherto	offered	(for	
example	basic	medical	services	and	medicines,	education).	This	mainly	affects	
the	lower	classes	of	society.	
16	 The	FSO	is	a	special	service	responsible	for	protecting	the	state’s	top	officials,	it	also	pre-
pares	analyses	regarding	the	situation	in	specific	regions,	see	http://rusrand.ru/response/
opros-ot-fso-v-monogorodah-usilivajutsja-depressivnye-nastroenija
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II. socIeTy and The crIsIs
Russians	are	aware	of	the	deteriorating	economic	situation.	According	to	re-
search	by	 the	Levada	Centre,	 in	August	2016	a	 staggering	80%	of	Russians	
agreed	with	the	statement	that	an	economic	crisis	is	ongoing	in	Russia17.	The	
perception	of	the	present	crisis	has	changed	over	time.	The	initial	hopes	within	
society	that	the	crisis	would	be	temporary,	boosted	by	optimistic	messages	from	
the	authorities,	are	now	giving	way	to	beliefs	that	the	crisis	is	likely	to	drag	
on18.	At	present,	the	proportion	of	individuals	who	hold	pessimistic	views	as	
to	the	prospects	for	the	development	of	the	economic	situation	is	around	50%.	
The	crisis	is	generating	fear	among	Russians	relating	mainly	to	possible	further	
price	increases	and	the	loss	of	savings.	To	a	considerably	lesser	extent	these	
fears	focus	on	possible	job	and	income	losses	(however,	the	fear	of	losing	one’s	
income	is	frequently	reported	by	businesspeople).	Alongside	this,	the	trauma	
associated	with	the	1990s	crisis	and	the	suspended	payment	of	salaries	makes	
Russians	fear	payment	delays.	Many	believe	that	the	law	is	being	violated	on	
a	large	scale	(according	to	research	by	the	Institute	of	Sociology	of	the	Russian	
Academy	of	Sciences,	in	October	2015	a	mere	8%	of	Russians	were	convinced	
that	the	labour	law	was	being	observed19).	
Although	the	drop	in	GDP	is	smaller	during	the	present	crisis	than	it	was	in	
2009	(around	-4%	in	2015	compared	with	-7.8%	in	2009),	due	to	its	persistence	
it	is	having	a	stronger	impact	on	the	shift	in	economic	behaviour	within	society.	
Especially	in	the	initial	stage	of	the	crisis,	many	households	decided	to	sell	their	
foreign	currency	savings.	However, the basic strategy for weathering the 
crisis involves limiting one’s expenses by: buying cheaper products and 
refraining from buying certain goods. During	the	present	crisis,	Russian	
people,	for	the	first	time	since	2008,	are	spending	on	average	over	50%	of	their	
17	 A	survey	by	the	Levada	Centre	on	how	the	crisis	is	perceived,	26	September	2016,	http://
www.levada.ru/2016/09/26/krizis-i-ozhidaniya-uvolnenij/
18	 According	to	the	Levada	Centre,	in	December	2014	31%	of	the	respondents	claimed	that	the	
crisis	is	unlikely	to	last	for	more	than	a	year	and	a	half,	and	23%	of	the	respondents	said	
that	it	would	be	two	or	more	years.	In	December	2015	37%	of	the	respondents	said	that	the	
crisis	in	unlikely	to	last	for	more	than	a	year	and	a	half,	and	44%	said	that	it	would	be	two	or	
more	years,	http://www.levada.ru/2016/02/12/monitoring-vospriyatiya-ekonomicheskoj-
situatsii-v-strane-dekabr-2015-yanvar-2016/	The	survey	organised	by	PWC	revealed	more	
pessimistic	opinions	the	Russians	have	regarding	the	likelihood	of	the	crisis	ending,	see	
http://www.pwc.ru/ru/press-releases/2016/consumer-business-report.html
19	 Н.	Тихонова,	Стратификация	в	России:	специфика	модели	и	вектор	изменений,	goo.
gl/XbZyxt
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household	budget	on	food,	cigarettes	and	alcohol20.	This	has	been	a	consequence	
of	the	increase	in	the	price	of	foodstuffs	on	the	one	hand,	and	on	the	other,	of	
limiting	the	expenses	on	other	goods	and	services.	Economists	suggest	that	peo-
ple	choose	to	adopt	a	‘survival’	strategy	which	involves	limiting	their	expenses.	
48%	of	the	surveyed	families	said	that	entertainment	expenses	are	among	those	
which	are	being	cut	(for	example	the	expenses	on	culture	and	travel).	45%	ad-
mitted	that	they	were	trying	to	limit	spending	on	clothing	and	shoes,	and	45%	
limit	are	limiting	their	food	expenses.	
During	the	crisis	it	is	evident	that	people	not	only	try	to	save	their	money,	but	
also	look	for	opportunities	to	earn	extra	income.	According	to	estimates	by	the	
Higher	School	of	Economics,	8.3%	of	Russians	are	seeking	an	extra	job,	but	the	
job	market	has	limited	absorption	capability,	as	a	consequence	of	which	the	
proportion	of	individuals	with	an	extra	source	of	income	has	not	changed	as	
a	result	of	the	crisis.	However, the level of informal employment, which is 
a manifestation of the phenomenon referred to in Russia as the ‘garage 
economy’, has been on the rise.	This	term	refers	to	informal	activity	of	small	
(often	one-person)	workshops	dealing	with	production	and	services	on	a	minor	
scale	(for	example	taxi	drivers	and	automotive	services	providers).	The	price	
rise	has	also	triggered	increased	use	of	residential	gardens	–	especially	in	rural	
regions	Russians	have	been	using	these	gardens	to	grow	vegetables	and	fruit	for	
individual	consumption.	Increased	use	of	residential	gardens	in	the	period	from	
February	until	April	2016	was	indicated	by	15%	of	the	respondents	surveyed	by	
the	Higher	School	of	Economics21.	The	scale	of	the	‘garage	economy’	is	extremely	
difficult	to	estimate,	one	of	the	reasons	being	that	it	is	different	in	individual	
regions.	According	to	some	researchers,	it	offers	money-making	opportunities	
to	as	much	as	a	third	of	the	working	age	population.	For	less	affluent	citizens,	
informal	economic	activity	and	the	use	of	small	farms	and	home	gardens	have	
become	a	method	for	surviving	and	escaping	from	extreme	poverty.	Similarly,	
the	traditional	inter-generation	solidarity,	typical	of	Russian	society	and	which	
manifests	itself	during	crises	in	increased	mutual	support	within	families,	has	
played	a	role	in	alleviating	the	consequences	of	the	crisis.
20	 For	 comparison,	 in	Poland	 these	 categories	 cover	 around	25%	of	household	 spending,	 in	
the	USA	around	10%.	Cf.	Н.	Райбман,	Впервые	за	восемь	лет	расходы	россиян	на	еду	
превысили	 остальные	 расходы,	 19	 April	 2016,	 http://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/
articles/2016/04/19/638228-rashodi-edu
21	 С.	Салтанова,	Как	россияне	борются	с	кризисом,	https://iq.hse.ru/news/	185	89	7751.html
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In	the	case	of	well-educated	cultured	individuals,	the	economic	crisis	combined	
with	the	mounting	repressive	nature	of	the	system	contributes	to	a	limitation	
of	the	availability	of	specific	career	paths.	This	causes	a boost in the so-called 
‘brain drain’	– a phenomenon which involves well-educated individuals 
emigrating from Russia to more developed economies.	In	absolute	numbers	
this	phenomenon	does	not	cover	a	large	number	of	people	and	is	extremely	dif-
ficult	to	measure	because	most	of	the	individuals	involved	do	not	report	their	de-
parture	to	Russian	institutions.	However,	the	available	Eurostat	data	for	2014	in-
dicate	a	significant	increase	in	the	proportion	of	Russians	who	have	been	granted	
a	permanent	residence	permit	in	an	EU	country	for	the	first	time22.	In	2014,	the	
number	of	such	individuals	was	over	22%	higher	than	in	2009.	The	outflow	of	the	
qualified	workforce	has	been	less	significant	than	in	the	early	1990s,	but	it	will	
likely	pose	a	serious	development	problem	for	Russia	in	the	future.
Alongside	this,	in connection with the economic crisis and the drop in the 
value of the Russian currency, a sharp downward trend regarding eco-
nomic migration to Russia can be observed.	This	forms	a	unique	buffer	re-
ducing	the	negative	consequences	of	the	crisis	on	the	job	market	for	Russian	
society.	The	introduction	at	the	beginning	of	2015	of	amended	laws	on	taking	
up	a	job	in	the	Russian	Federation	alongside	the	deterioration	of	the	situation	
on	the	Russian	job	market,	which	used	to	absorb	economic	migrants	from	the	
former	Soviet	republics,	led	to	numerous	immigrants	leaving	Russia.	Accord-
ing	to	official	statistics	by	the	Federal	Migration	Service,	in	2015	the	number	
of	immigrants	living	in	Russia	fell	by	around	10%,	and	the	data	compiled	by	
the	Central	Bank	suggest	that	remittances	from	Russia	to	the	CIS	countries	
shrank	by	over	50%23.	Despite	this,	the	Russian	job	market	continues	to	depend	
on	a	migrant	workforce	to	a	certain	extent.	Migrants	take	up	jobs	which	ethnic	
Russians	find	less	attractive	(especially	in	the	sector	of	low-paid	services),	which	
is	why	the	data	for	2016	indicate	a	certain	reversal	of	the	trend	and	an	increase	
in	economic	migration	to	Russia.
The	intention	to	cut	household	expenditure	and	the	related	reduction	of	the	
living	standard	are	elements	of	Russian	society’s	dominant	strategy	for	weath-
ering	the	crisis.	According	to	research	by	the	Levada	Centre,	when	describing	
their	financial	situation	58%	of	Russians	use	the	simple	phrase:	“it	is	difficult	
22	 Data	by	Eurostat,	http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Residence_
permits_statistics#Source_data_for_tables_and_figures_.28MS_Excel.29
23	 Data	by	the	Central	Bank	of	Russia,	http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/?Prtid=svs&ch=TGO_sp_
post#CheckedItem
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to	live,	but	we	can	bear	it”.	This suggests that Russian society is undergoing 
a change in how it functions during the crisis – from a consumer society 
to a ‘shortage society’ which focuses on physical survival in a situation of 
shortages and deficiency24.	This	approach	of	waiting	patiently	for	the	difficult	
times	to	be	over	is	deeply	rooted	in	Russia’s	history,	therefore	it	is	unlikely	that	
the	plan	to	abandon	the	prosperity	policy	will	pose	a	threat	to	the	country’s	
present	leadership.
24	 Л.	Гудков,	Мечты	о	прошлом.	Почему	кризисы	приводят	к	реанимации	советских	
представлений,	Republic,	14	August	2016,	https://slon.ru/posts/66665
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III. socIeTy and The governmenT:  
The poTenTIal for proTesT
The	economic	crisis	equates	to	a	complete	withdrawal	from	the	unique	social	
accord	which	used	to	be	one	of	the	foundations	of	Putin’s	‘epoch’.	In	exchange	
for	increasing	prosperity	and	relative	stability,	which	had	been	absent	from	
the	turbulent	1990s,	the	government	gained	approval	and	society	withdrew	
from	its	supervision	of	political	processes.	Despite	this,	the	present	economic	
crisis	has	had	a	minor	impact	on	Russian	people’s	attitude	towards	the	govern-
ment.	The increasingly negative assessments of the economic situation 
and the related drop in expectations regarding the financial situation 
have had only a marginal impact on the level of support for the govern-
ment. Moreover, the drop in approval rating does not relate to President 
Putin. A	number	of	factors	seem	to	reduce	the	likelihood	of	the	feeling	of	dep-
rivation	present	within	society	being	translated	into	social	activities	which	
would	be	unfavourable	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	government,	such	as:	pro-
tests,	a	significant	boost	in	support	for	the	opposition,	and	open	criticism	of	
the	government.	These	factors	include	the	relatively	high	level	of	dependence	
which	Russian	people	have	on	the	state,	the	widespread	conviction	that	there	
is	no	alternative	for	the	present	leadership,	and	the	relatively	weak	bridging	
social	capital	(standards	of	cooperation	and	networks	between	people	stem-
ming	from	various	social	groups),	which	manifests	itself	in	the	low	level	of	
confidence	in	individuals	from	outside	one’s	immediate	circle	and	in	society’s	
low	degree	of	self-organisation.
It seems, however, that the number of protests has been on the rise dur-
ing the crisis. The main issues which encouraged people to attend protests 
included: cases of the violation of employees’ rights25, problems with access 
to services which emerged as a result of spending cuts introduced by the 
government (for example combining several hospitals into one, closing 
small schools, liquidating the post of school doctors), and the subsequent 
rises of various public levies (for example regulated rent). Only extremely 
rarely do the protests have a supra-local reach.	The	rallies	are	not	usually	
politically-motivated,	they	are	isolated	and	do	not	focus	on	the	most	common	
25	 According	to	the	independent	Centre	for	Social	and	Employees’	Rights,	in	Russia	the	num-
ber	of	employee	protests	increased	significantly	in	2015	(by	nearly	40%),	and	the	upward	
trend	was	maintained	also	in	several	months	of	2016.	The	most	important	problems	which	
inspired	the	protests	included	delayed	payments	of	salaries,	the	policy	pursued	by	the	man-
agements	of	companies	(for	example	restructuring)	and	layoffs,	http://trudprava.ru/news/
protestnews/1589
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problems.	The	few	exceptions	to	this	rule	were	protests	which	spread	to	the	
capital	cities	of	the	majority	of	Russia’s	regions:	the	protest	by	employees	of	the	
emergency	ambulance	service	organised	in	late	2014	and	the	protest	by	truck	
drivers	against	the	introduction	of	road	usage	fees	which	started	in	November	
2015	(see	box	below).	The	feeling	within	society	is	that	the	likelihood	of	new	
protests	being	organised	is	insignificant.	This	has	been	confirmed	in	surveys	
–	in	December	2015	21%	of	the	respondents	surveyed	by	the	Levada	Centre	con-
sidered	economically-motivated	protests	likely,	whereas	during	the	1998–1999	
crisis	a	staggering	48%	of	Russians	considered	protests	likely.	Similarly,	the	
level	of	readiness	to	take	part	in	protests	was	found	to	be	considerably	lower	–	
in	December	2015	13%	of	the	respondents	declared	they	were	prepared	to	take	
part	in	a	protest	focused	on	economic	demands	(compared	to	as	much	as	33%	of	
the	respondents	in	1998)26.
The anatomy of strike – the ‘platon’ system
The mechanisms used by the authorities involving the control of society 
and diverting people’s attention from the problems of daily life sometimes 
fail. In late autumn 2015 in several regions of Russia protests by truck 
drivers broke out against the introduction of the ‘Platon’ system and col-
lection of tolls for the use of national roads. According to the drivers, the 
fees for using federal roads were excessively high, which made their eco-
nomic activity unprofitable. The protesters’ anger was stoked by the fact 
that the revenue from the toll collection system was earned mainly by the 
system operator, a company owned by the Rotenberg brothers – friends of 
Vladimir Putin. In a short time, the protests covered the whole of Russia 
and became some of the biggest economically-motivated protests organised 
in recent years (they covered 24 of the total 83 regions27). The protest by 
truck drivers enjoyed support from society. According to estimates by the 
Levada Centre, in December 2015 63% of Russians and a staggering 72% of 
Moscow residents supported the actions by the drivers28. 
26	 Денис	Волков,	Кризис	в	умах:	стоит	ли	ждать	массовых	протестов,	Forbes,	18	February	
2016,	http://www.forbes.ru/mneniya-column/protesty/313135-krizis-v-umakh-stoit-li-zh-
dat-massovykh-protestov
27	 Excluding	Crimea	and	Sevastopol.
28	 A	 survey	by	 the	Levada	Centre	 regarding	protests	by	 truck	drivers,	http://www.levada.
ru/2015/12/30/protesty-dalnobojshhikov-i-gotovnost-protestovat-sredi-naseleniya/,	accessed	
2	November	2016.
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The drivers used numerous forms of protest (road blockades, demonstra-
tions, driving at a slow pace through cities, petitions etc.), which made it 
difficult for the government to prevent them. The large scale of the protests 
was possible mainly due to the drivers’ networking activity. The earnings of 
truck drivers, who usually operate as one-man companies, have decreased 
significantly during the crisis. Faced with the potential loss of livelihood, 
the drivers proved to be a determined and independent group. The scale 
of the protests surprised the government, who initially offered restrained 
reactions, which additionally fostered the emergence of new centres of pro-
test. The drivers relatively quickly decided to present their demands di-
rectly to the president, which made it more difficult for the Kremlin to use 
the well-tested mechanism of shifting the responsibility onto the regions, 
but at the same time enabled Putin to play the role of the ‘good tsar’ who 
responds to society’s needs.
Despite the large scale of the protest against the introduction of the ‘Platon’ 
system, the Kremlin decided to reduce the tax imposed on the drivers only 
slightly and to maintain the system. The authorities granted the truck driv-
ers the right to deduct the tolls paid under the ‘Platon’ system from their 
transport tax and reduced the fines for failure to pay them. This solution has 
to a certain extent reduced the burden imposed on the drivers and contrib-
uted to silencing the protests. The costs of the deducted amount of tax are 
credited to the budgets of specific regions which used to earn revenue from 
the transport tax. The reaction of the government is also proof of the fact 
that although they fear protests and intend to cut spending, the interests of 
the closest circle of friends of Vladimir Putin remain carefully protected.
Russian	people’s	reluctance	to	become	politically	involved	is	a	factor	reducing	
the	likelihood	of	protests.	In	a	situation	of	the	mounting	repressive	nature	of	the	
system,	refraining	from	protests	is	viewed	as	a	rational	strategy.	Russian	sociol-
ogist	Lev	Gudkov	referred	to	the	attitude	which	prevails	in	society	as	“inertia	of	
passive	adaptation”29.	It	is	a	reaction	to	measures	taken	by	the	government	and	
to	the	deteriorating	living	conditions	which	involves	adaptation	to	the	increas-
ingly	difficult	financial	situation	rather	than	resistance	to	it.	On	the	one	hand,	
this	type	of	creeping	apathy	is	tantamount	to	Russian	people	accepting	the	ag-
gressive	policy	pursued	by	the	Kremlin	on	the	international	stage	and	coming	to	
terms	with	the	repressive	nature	of	domestic	policy.	On	the	other	hand,	it	spells	
29	 Л.	Гудков,	Инерция	пассивной	адаптации,	http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Proet-
Contra_51_20-42_all.pdf
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a	diminishing	potential	for	expressing	active	support	for	the	policy	pursued	by	
the	government.	The	hope	that	any	political	change	may	happen	in	Russia	has	
been	dwindling	even	in	circles	which	are	critical	of	the	Kremlin.
An anti-system mood and actions are additionally weakened by the high 
level of state control of the economy, which successfully prevents any 
manifestations of resistance. During	the	rule	of	Vladimir	Putin	the	big	share	
of	the	public	sector	in	the	economy30	has	brought	people	employed	in	this	sec-
tor	relative	prosperity31.	However,	the	improvement	of	their	financial	situation	
has	mainly	brought	about	a	change	in	consumption	patterns	instead	of	a	shift	
in	the	system	of	values	or	the	model	of	citizens’	participation.	In	the	Russian	
situation,	the	middle	class,	which	is	sometimes	referred	to	as	a	potential	force	
striving	for	democratisation,	does	not	formulate	demands	involving	political	
change.	The	middle	class	is	in	large	part	composed	of	employees	of	the	state	sec-
tor32.	It	mainly	comprises	individuals	from	those	social	groups	which	improved	
their	financial	situation	during	the	presidency	of	Vladimir	Putin	following	the	
period	of	significant	economic	deterioration	in	the	1990s.	En masse, the	middle	
class	is	interested	in	maintaining	stability;	furthermore,	it	is	characterised	by	
an	impressive	ability	to	adapt	to	the	deteriorating	living	conditions.	Despite	
the	fact	that	when	surveyed,	representatives	of	this	class	often	express	their	
concern	with	the	domestic	situation,	they	concurrently	fear	destabilisation,	
which	is	why	they	treat	the	present	government	as	the	best	of	all	possible	op-
tions.	In	this	context,	the	protests	of	2011	and	2012	were	exceptions	to	the	rule	
and	saw	a	short	period	of	increased	political	activity	resulting	mainly	from	
social	discontent.	This	was	triggered	by	the	fact	that	the	hopes	a	portion	of	the	
middle	class	nurtured	during	the	presidency	of	Dmitri	Medvedev	were	never	
fulfilled.	The	failure	of	those	protests	has	permanently	discouraged	people	from	
this	type	of	involvement.	The present economic crisis has severely impacted 
the standards of living of the most politically active segments of the mid-
30	 In	2005,	the	estimated	share	of	the	state	in	the	economy	was	35%.	This	figure	was	70%	in	
2015,	 http://www.rbc.ru/economics/29/09/2016/57ecd5429a794730e1479fac.	 According	 to	
data	compiled	by	Prof.	Natalia	Zubarevich,	at	present	27%	of	the	workforce	is	employed	in	
the	state	sector.
31	 А.	Соколов,	И.	Терентьев,	Исследование	РБК:	сколько	в	России	чинов	ников	и	много	
ли	они	зарабатывают,	RBK,	15	October	2014,	http://www.rbc.ru/economics/15/10/2014/54
3cfe56cbb20f8c4e0b98f2
32	 According	 to	 estimates	 by	 sociologist	 Natalia	 Tikhonova	 from	 the	 Russian	 Academy	
of	Sciences,	nearly	half	 of	 the	Russian	middle	 class	 is	 employed	 in	 the	 state	 sectors.	 For	
a	more	comprehensive	analysis	of	the	Russian	middle	class	see	Н.	Никс,	Средний	класс	в	
современной	России:	 10	лет	 спустя;	https://www.hse.ru/pubs/share/direct/document/	
172441014
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dle class residing in big cities. Alongside the repressive measures which 
have intensified following the 2011–2012 protests, this has significantly 
reduced the potential for political involvement within this group. 
Despite	the	lack	of	evident	manifestations	of	any	emerging	protest	movement,	
the	government	fears	the	consequences	of	the	deteriorating	financial	situa-
tion	of	the	population	and	has	introduced	preventive	measures	to	avoid	any	
expression	of	social	discontent.	Even	if	they	were	short-lived,	the	social	protests	
worried	the	government	ahead	of	parliamentary	elections	held	in	September	
2016	and	the	presidential	election	planned	for	March	2018.	The government’s 
tactic aimed at minimising the likelihood of protests in connection with 
the persistent crisis mainly involves: stepping up the repressive nature of 
the system, maintaining the high level of citizens’ dependence on the state, 
and protecting the authority of the president at the same time shifting the 
responsibility onto lower levels of government.
The	Kremlin	has	managed	to	devise	techniques	to	successfully	manipulate	pub-
lic	opinion	and	influence	it	according	to	specific	needs.	The	majority	of	Russian	
mass	media	is	controlled	by	the	state	or	belong	to	oligarchs	who	are	loyal	to	
the	government.	For	the	Kremlin,	the	mass	media	is	a	tool	to	pursue	its	infor-
mation	policy	and	influence	social	mood.	The	propaganda	machine	is	efficient,	
and	approval	for	the	Kremlin’s	policy	remains	consistently	high.	As	a	result	
of	the	annexation	of	Crimea	and	the	launch	of	the	disinformation	campaign	
regarding	the	conflict	in	Ukraine,	over	a	year	President	Putin’s	approval	rat-
ing	grew	from	61%	in	November	2013	to	88%	in	October	201433.	Despite	a	slight	
downward	trend,	the	so-called	‘Crimea	effect’	and	the	intensive	propaganda	
activities	regarding	the	conflict	in	Ukraine	and	the	intervention	in	Syria	have	
made	it	possible	to	maintain	the	president’s	approval	rating	(the	so-called	‘Pu-
tin	rating’)	at	a	level	exceeding	80%.	This	is	an	extremely	high	result,	although	
due	to	its	methodological	limitations	this	indicator	should	rather	be	viewed	as	
a	touchstone	of	certain	trends.	When	analysing	quantitative	data	regarding	
Russian	society	it	is	necessary	to	take	into	account	the	error	resulting	from	
the	following	factors:	the	respondents’	fear	of	providing	honest	answers34,	the	
33	 Data	by	the	Levada	Centre	regarding	support	for	various	government	institutions:	http://
www.levada.ru/indikatory/odobrenie-organov-vlasti/
34	 In	a	survey	regarding	the	fear	of	providing	honest	answers,	around	50%	of	the	respond-
ents	said	that	Russians	are	unwilling	to	reveal	their	opinions	when	taking	part	in	surveys,	
and	around	25%	admitted	that	they	personally	fear	to	provide	answers,	http://www.levada.
ru/2016/01/22/strah-vyskazat-svoe-mnenie/
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lack	of	democratic	traditions,	the	relatively	high	proportion	of	individuals	who	
refuse	to	take	part	in	a	survey	in	specific	social	groups,	and	the	limited	access	
the	respondents	have	to	independent	sources	of	information.	Some	research-
ers	claim	that	confidence	in	a	specific	institution	in	Russia	is	often	seen	by	the	
respondents	as	equivalent	to	recognising	that	it	plays	a	major	role	in	the	system.	
It	is	only	after	this	context	is	taken	into	account,	that	a	deeper	interpretation	of	
the	survey	data	is	possible.
Maintaining	a	high	approval	rating	for	President	Putin	is	becoming	the	Krem-
lin’s	overriding	priority	and	the	results	of	subsequent	surveys	are	used	to	
legitimise	all	 the	actions	by	the	government.	The	president	enjoys	unique	
immunity	as	he	plays	the	role	of	an	arbiter	disciplining	other	institutions	of	
government.	The	ritual	which	shows	this	strategy	in	the	most	striking	man-
ner	is	the	annual	carefully	directed,	several-hours-long	televised	conference	
connecting	the	president	with	the	nation.	During	this	conference	Putin	solves	
the	problems	reported	by	citizens:	from	international	issues,	through	cor-
ruption,	to	potholes	in	the	road.	Putin’s	popularity	is	to	a	large	extent	built	
on	his	image	as	an	energetic,	tough	leader	who	does	not	fear	confrontation	
with	other	states.	To	a	large	extent,	it	is	the	president’s	authority	that	guar-
antees	the	system’s	stability	and	prevents	social	discontent	(which	has	been	
growing	slightly	since	the	end	of	2015)	from	translating	into	protests	or	the	
increased	popularity	of	opposition	parties.	Another tactic to maintain the 
president’s high approval rating involves shifting the responsibility in 
crisis situations onto the regional level of government or onto members 
of government and putting the blame for the widespread deterioration 
of the economic situation on other countries and the international situ-
ation. The	majority	of	the	time,	the	media	associated	with	the	Kremlin	point	
to	hostile	actions	by	other	states	and	falling	oil	prices	as	the	main	causes	of	
the	economic	crisis.	Both	these	factors	are	presented	as	independent	of	the	
actions	of	the	Kremlin	and	as	such	they	do	not	burden	the	government	with	
the	responsibility	for	deteriorating	living	standards.	Unpopular	decisions	are	
formally	made	by	the	cabinet	which	enjoys	much	lower	support	among	Rus-
sians	than	the	president.	When	there	were	protests	against	the	introduction	
of	a	toll	system	for	trucks	using	federal	roads	or	protests	by	health	care	work-
ers,	as	well	as	increasingly	frequent	local	rallies,	the	government	tends	not	
to	make	significant	concessions	towards	society,	fearing	that	this	could	be	
viewed	as	a	sign	of	weakness.	Decisions	are	usually	postponed	or	only	slightly	
amended.	At	the	same	time,	during	protests,	which	from	the	Kremlin’s	point	
of	view	may	reach	alarming	proportions,	most	frequently	the	role	of	‘scape-
goat’	is	played	by	regional	authorities	or	members	of	the	cabinet,	which	has	in	
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turn	contributed	to	a	drop	in	their	approval	rating35.	The	strategy	involving	the	
shifting	of	costs	and	responsibility	for	alleviating	the	consequences	of	the	crisis	
has	led	to	a	situation	in	which	the	drop	in	revenues	to	the	regions’	budgets	has	
coincided	with	the	regions’	welfare	spending	(mainly	social	benefits)	increasing	
by	5–8%36.	This	was	accompanied	by	an	increase	in	the	regions’	budget	deficit.
Isolated	protests	organised	by	groups	who	are	determined	to	act	when	facing	
a	threat	can	have	a	large-scale	reach,	as	indicated	by	the	protest	by	truck	driv-
ers.	Even	in	a	situation	of	a	relatively	high	level	of	desperation,	the	strike	par-
ticipants	avoid	presenting	purely	political	demands.	They	tend	to	adopt	a	strat-
egy	of	referring	to	the	president’s	authority,	which	indirectly	strengthens	his	
position.	As	a	consequence,	President	Putin’s	approval	rating	remains	high,	
despite	the	fact	that	most	Russians	claim	that	the	Russian	government	has	failed	
to	deliver	on	its	pledge	to	society.
The	government	is	focused	on	avoiding	the	mere	risk	of	an	outbreak	of	protests.	
To	achieve	this,	they	have	stepped	up	the	repressive	nature	of	the	system	and	
prevented	the	organisation	of	legal	demonstrations.	One	of	the	manifestations	
of	the	increased	repressive	measures	were	the	several	year-long	prison	sen-
tences	for	participants	in	large	demonstrations	against	President	Putin	organ-
ised	in	Bolotnaya	Square	in	Moscow	in	May	2012.	The	rising	number	of	cases	
of	 incarceration	for	posting	certain	materials	online	(for	example	on	social	
media)	is	proof	of	a	constant	increase	of	the	repressive	nature	of	the	system37.	
The	government	is	trying	to	disable	the	organisation	of	legal	protests,	for	ex-
ample	by	refusing	to	grant	consent	for	such	protests	and	limiting	the	freedom	
of	operation	of	non-governmental	organisations	(for	example	laws	have	been	
adopted	regarding	so-called	‘foreign	agents’	and	‘unwanted	organisations’).	In	
this	way	they	reduce	the	freedom	of	operation	of	institutions	which	could	po-
tentially	become	organisers	of	protests38.	Moreover,	the	government	is	involved	
in	actions	aimed	at	intimidating	Russian	elites	and	the	potential	opponents	of	
Vladimir	Putin.	Actions	such	as	the	assassination	of	the	opposition	politician	
35	 Data	compiled	by	the	Levada	Centre	regarding	support	for	various	government	institutions:	
http://www.levada.ru/indikatory/odobrenie-organov-vlasti/
36	 Ежемесячный	мониторинг	социально–экономического	положения	и	самочувствия	
населения	2015	г.	-	май	2016	г.,	ed.	Т.М.	Малева.
37	 Антиэкстремизм	в	виртуальной	России	в	2014–2015	годы,	http://www.sova-center.ru/
racism-xenophobia/publications/2016/06/d34913/
38	 By	 the	 beginning	 of	 December	 2016	 seven	 foreign	 non-governmental	 organisations	 had	
been	 considered	 unwanted,	 http://minjust.ru/ru/activity/nko/unwanted,	 and	 148	 have	
been	categorised	as	‘foreign	agents’,	http://unro.minjust.ru/NKOForeignAgent.aspx#
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Boris	Nemtsov	in	February	2015,	in	which	officers	of	the	law	enforcement	agen-
cies	controlled	by	Ramzan	Kadyrov,	the	President	of	Chechnya,	were	involved,	
or	the	campaign	aimed	at	discrediting	the	leaders	of	minor	opposition	parties	
decrease	the	chances	that	new	leaders	will	emerge	who	could	act	as	mouthpieces	
of	social	discontent.	
This	tactic	has	proved	successful	and	the	increased repressive measures and 
bolstered state propaganda are contributing to a progressing atomisation 
of society and hampering society’s self-organisation.	The	deterioration	of	so-
cial	mood	has	no	impact	on	the	level	of	support	for	the	government	as	measured	
in	surveys,	as	this	remains	very	high.	It	seems	that	these	results	are	not	so	much	
the	product	of	active	support	for	the	government	as	of	the	lack	of	alternatives.	
In	a	situation	where	there	is	a	potential	threat	to	the	system	of	power,	the	high	
approval	rating	for	the	government	declared	in	surveys,	which	the	Kremlin	
uses	to	confirm	its	legitimacy,	would	most	likely	find	no	reflection	in	active	
support	for	the	present	regime.
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Iv. ouTlook
The	Russian	economy	has	been	in	crisis	for	two	years	now	and	nothing	indicates	
that	it	may	return	to	the	path	of	economic	growth	which	would	be	perceptible	
to	society.
There	is	a	feeling	within	society	that	economic	problems	are	not	of	a	temporary	
nature39,	and	the	change	in	the	financial	situation,	the	deterioration	of	living	
standards	and	consumption	standards	will	likely	be	durable.	Similarly,	no	rapid	
changes	in	the	job	market	should	be	expected.	According	to	economists,	the	
most	likely	scenario	for	Russia	involves	stagnation	which	will	likely	be	accom-
panied	by	a	continuation	of	the	former	processes	on	the	job	market,	including	in	
particular	the	increasing	importance	of	the	informal	employment	sector.	Due	
to	a	number	of	institutional	factors	which	keep	the	unemployment	level	low,	
any	rapid	increase	in	the	number	of	the	unemployed	is	unlikely.
The	government	will	likely	seek	further	budget	savings.	Spending cuts in the 
sectors of education, health care and public transportation will contribute 
to a further deterioration of living standards in Russia, form barriers to 
future development, and fuel social discontent. It	cannot	be	ruled	out	that	
in	the	long-term	the	present	economic	crisis	will	cause	a	drop	in	the	number	of	
children	born	per	year	and	have	an	impact	on	the	general	health	of	the	popula-
tion	due	to	health	care	spending	cuts.	However, it is unlikely that the deterio-
ration of the financial situation and of the living standards of the Russian 
population will result in large-scale outbreaks of social discontent which 
could pose a threat to the regime. While	financial	resources	are	dwindling	
and	the	public	services	eroding,	Russians	will	probably	prefer	stability	over	
political	change.	However,	isolated	outbursts	of	society’s	frustration	should	be	
expected	in	the	form	of	protests	focusing	on	the	introduction	of	new	taxes	and	
fees,	on	cases	of	the	violation	of	employees’	rights,	and	the	deteriorating	quality	
of	public	services.
It	should	be	expected	that	the	government	will	continue	the	present	strategy.	
The	system’s	attention	will	be	focused	on	preventing	any	economically-motivat-
ed	rebellion	and	in	the	case	of	isolated	socially-motivated	protests,	the	Krem-
lin	will	resort	to	insignificant	concessions	and	shift	the	responsibility	for	the	
39	 A	survey-based	research	by	PWC	shows	that	the	respondents	point	to	2019	as	the	year	in	
which	the	crisis	is	likely	to	end.	See	http://www.pwc.ru/ru/press-releases/2016/consum-
er-business-report.html
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situation	onto	other	institutions.	In	the	context	of	the	rising	concern	the	elites	
have	with	the	social	situation,	the	repressive	nature	of	the	system	will	likely	
be	stepped	up	and	the	freedom	of	operation	of	independent	institutions	will	be	
limited.	As	the	presidential	election	planned	for	2018	approaches,	the	nervous-
ness	of	the	government	will	most	likely	increase	and	the	defamatory	campaign	
targeting	internal	enemies,	accompanied	by	propaganda	actions,	will	probably	
intensify.
Although	 the	 strategy	 adopted	 by	 the	 government	 involving,	 for	 example,	
emphasising	the	temporary	nature	of	the	problems	and	pointing	to	external	
enemies	has	so	far	proved	successful	and	fostered	social	unification,	certain	
isolated	symptoms	of	its	waning	potential	may	be	observed.	In	particular	more	
affluent	groups	are	beginning	to	assess	the	direction	for	which	the	country	is	
heading	less	positively;	they	are	observing	the	deteriorating	living	standards	
with	growing	concern40.	Although	the	Russian	people	claim	to	be	ready	to	give	
up	Western	products	or	travelling	to	Western	countries	in	the	name	of	strength-
ening	their	country’s	position	in	the	international	arena,	they	do	not	consent	
to	tax	rises,	salary	freezes,	an	increase	in	the	retirement	age	and	employment	
cuts.	If	Russian	people	begin	to	feel	humiliated	(for	example	as	a	result	of	the	
deteriorating	quality	of	public	services),	outbursts	of	social	discontent	will	be	
likely.	Despite	its	political	apathy,	Russian	society	has	set	certain	limits	of	its	
consent	for	reducing	its	living	standards.	Going	beyond	these	limits	will	not	
instantaneously	 trigger	social	rebellion.	However,	should	there	be	a	power	
struggle	within	the	elite,	resulting	in	the	emergence	of	an	alternative	to	the	
present	ruling	group,	then	society	will	be	unlikely	to	offer	active	support	to	
the	present	regime41.
JAn StRzeleckI
40	 Н.Тихонова,	Стратификация…,	op. cit.
41	 One	quote	which	illustrates	the	lack	of	involvement	in	showing	support	for	the	government	
was	recalled	by	sociologist	Alexei	Levinson	from	the	Levada	Centre	regarding	Vladimir	Pu-
tin	and	was	originally	provided	by	a	participant	in	a	focus	group	research	session:	“I	think	
that	his	time	is	over,	that	is,	he	is	currently	at	the	top.	So	it	is	in	life	that	one	gets	to	the	top	
and	then	leaves	in	a	beautiful	fashion”.	
